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Lexmark, Watermarks, Skylink and Marketplaces: Misuse and Misperception of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Anticircumvention Provision
By
Molly Torsen*
© 2004, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
ABSTRACT
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was not intended to curb circumvention for
purposes of reverse-engineering that leads to technical interoperability. As an Act
meant to mend some of the awkward bridges between an analog culture and a digital
culture, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has been shown to contain some
ambiguous language that courts have interpreted inconsistently. Recent case law
demonstrates opposite conclusions regarding reverse-engineering for purposes of
attaining interoperability; the correct interpretation continues to allow for it, just as
traditional copyright law would
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act [hereinafter "DMCA"] provides that "no
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."1 According to Congress, the DMCA was designed "to
facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce,
communications, research, development, and education in the digital age."
2
Furthermore, the DMCA was meant to "provide certainty for copyright owners and
Internet service providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online." 3 The
DMCA is necessary in an age when material can be illegally copied and distributed over
the Internet without the need for technological expertise. However, when the DMCA is
1 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
2 Mr. Hatch, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 10 5 h Congress Report, Senate 2d session, May 11,
1998.
3 Id.
improperly applied and traditional copyright law is trumped by excising the fair use
provision, the DMCA adversely effects technological innovation.
4
The "work" referred to in the DMCA is simply something that can be
copyrighted under the original Copyright Act. However, regardless of the form or
format in which it is described or explained, copyright protection for an original work
of authorship never extends to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery. 5 The Copyright Act includes a subset of subject matter
referred to as "literary works," such as computer programs in object or source code.
6
The DMCA provides for a ban related to use controls in § 1201(b)(1), which has been
described as "a deliberate attempt by Congress to allow for fair use."7 If this were not
Congress' intent, when an underlying act of copying is lawful--such as when there is a
fair use--a prohibition on the act of circumventing a use control would functionally
prohibit the permissible use.
8
The DMCA is an improper conduit through which the marketplace of digital
technologies is altered. The reverse-engineering provision in the DMCA, section
1201(f), is an exception that "permits circumvention, and the development of
4 Calling on Congress to Amend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act andImprove Trade with Chile,
Singapore and Other Trading Partners, quoting Rep. Boucher, available at
http://www.house.gov/boucher/docs/lofgren.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
6 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983).
7 Robert P. Taylor and Ethan B. Andelman, Anticircumvention under the DMCA: Where Do We Stand
After Five Years?, The Computer & Internet Lawyer, Vol. 21, No. 3, March 2004, at 2, citing U.S. v.
Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
8 R. Anthony Reese, Will MergingAccess Controls andRights Controls Undermine the Structure of
Anticircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 619, 647 352 (2003).
technological means for such circumvention, by a person who has lawfully obtained a
right to use a copy of a computer program for the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability with other
programs .... ,9 There is no provision in the DMCA that provides new rules for the
digital marketplace; circumvention is still permissible.
Given this fundamental notion, and coupled with this skeletal framework for
copyright law, this writing will critique the recent case Lexmark International, Inc., v.
Static Control Components, Inc.,l0 which unjustifiably chilled marketplace competition
when the court held that the defendant's copying of the plaintiffs' programs did not
constitute fair use. The Lexmark case will then be related to legislative materials and
compared with other recent literature. With those materials as a backdrop, new formats
for digital rights management will be examined, and their legitimacy will be discussed
through a filter of economic reasoning. Finally, it will be shown that the decision in
Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Technologies" better interprets the pith of the DMCA
than does the Lexmark case.
I. The Lexmark Case
Lexmark, Inc. [hereinafter "Lexmark"] produces, inter alia, laser printers and
toner cartridges. Lexmark manufactures two different kinds of cartridges, an expensive
version that works interchangeably with other toner brands and a less-expensive version
9U.S. Copyright Office Summary of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, at 5.
10 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
"1292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. I11. 2003).
that must be sent back to Lexmark upon its expiry for replacement.12 This latter version
is equipped with a computer code on a microchip that prevents other brands of toner
from being compatible with the cartridge. Static Control Components, Inc. [hereinafter
"Static"] is a company that manufactures and sells, inter alia, components for
remanufactured toner cartridges, including the "Smartek" chip. The Smartek chip
enabled Lexmark customers to forego purchasing a new box of Lexmark toner for the
less-expensive cartridge. 13
Lexmark filed a complaint in December of 2002, asserting that the "Smartek"
chip manufactured by Static infringed Lexmark's DMCA copyright protection in its
Toner Loading Program. The program involves a sequence of technological
communications that authenticate a toner after determining whether the toner is
compatible with the Lexmark hardware. Static "acknowledge[d] that it specifically
designed its Smartek microchip to circumvent Lexmark's authentication sequence."'
14
Static argued that the purpose of the DMCA was to prevent software piracy, and not to
affect efforts to make different companies' hardware compatible, i.e., interoperable,
with each other. In March of 2003, the Lexmark court disagreed with Static's argument,
finding that Static's activity was "wholesale, identical copying of Lexmark's Toner
Loading Programs for commercial exploitation and profit."' 15 However, the Lexmark
court did not adequately incorporate the reasoning from the 1992 Ninth Circuit case
12 Jesse Walker, Static Controls: Copyrights and Printer Cartridges, ASAP, Gale Group, Oct. 1, 2003.
13 Lexmark v. Static Control, supra note 10, at 946.
14 Id., at 955.
15 id.
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 16 wherein the court allowed the narrow exception of
copying a copyrighted program for purposes of reverse-engineering activities. The
Sega court struggled with copyright fair use factors and public policy concerns, but
found this exception permissible since reverse-engineering was the only way to analyze
the ideas embedded in computer programs.17 The Lexmark court distinguished Sega by
pointing out that Static "did not have to engage in wholesale copying of the Toner
Loading Programs in their entirety to enable interoperability."'
18
Static appealed the decision and filed an antitrust suit against Lexmark for
trying to monopolize the market for toner cartridges that are used in Lexmark printers.19
After the preliminary decision in the antitrust case, Static asked the Copyright Office for
permission under the DMCA to reverse-engineer the computer chips in Lexmark's
printers. 2 The DMCA protects the right to reverse-engineer a product for the purposes
of making another product work with it:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who
has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program
may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are
necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs, and that have not previously
been readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to the
16 Sega Enters. Ltd. V Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 Lexmark, supra note 10, at 959.
18 Id, at 961.
'9 See, e.g., Sridhar Hardur, Man with a Mission, HP World, Vol. 8 No. 1, available at
http://www.hpworld.com/hpworldnews/hpw40l/news7.jsp. "Static has filed an appeal in the United
States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, against the Kentucky court's preliminary injunction." Id
20 Lorraine Woellert, Let Reverse-Engineering Go Forward, Business Week Online, Nov. 5, 2003.
extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not constitute
infringement under this title.
2 1
The Copyright Office registrar decided that "interoperability necessarily
includes... concerns for functionality and use, and not only of individual use, but for
enabling competitive choices in the marketplace." 22 The Copyright Office did not grant
the exemption because the above provision from 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) indicated that
no exemption was necessary, and both Static Control and Lexmark claimed victory
from this decision.2 3 The Copyright Office agreed with Static Control - and the great
majority of commentators - that the DMCA was never intended to lock out aftermarket
competition.
24
In a well-written amicus brief in support of Static's position, the Computer and
Communications Industry Association honed in on the Copyright Office's point, i.e., in
order to prevent precisely the sort of anticompetitive use of the DMCA that Lexmark
chose to employ, Congress crafted an exception in Section 1201(f) for the express
purpose of permitting the circumvention necessary to achieve interoperability between
two software components. 25  In regard to the Lexmark court's finding that Static
produced its technology by "wholesale copying," the amicus brief cited Computer
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1). Emphasis added.
22 Woellert, supra note 20, quoting Marybeth Peters.
23 Frank Ahrens, Caught by the Act, Newsbytes, Nov. 12, 2003.
24 Stephen M. Kramarsky, Digital Copyright Act; Law is Designed to Stop Pirates, Not Aftermarket
Competition, New York Law Journal, Dec. 23, 2003.
25 Amicus Brief in Support of Static Control Components, Inc., Computer and Communications Industry
Association, 9, July 1, 2003.
Associates International v. Altai;26 the court there referred to well-settled copyright law
by recognizing that, as utilitarian works, computer programs are highly constrained by
external factors. 27 Clearly, interoperability has gained a special place in relation to fair
use and reverse engineering and is permissible. The Altai court correctly ruled that
similarities resulting from the need to interoperate with other components of a computer
system did not constitute copyright infringement.
28
The Lexmark court further tried to justify its position by noting that:
Lexmark's Prebate program ha[d] been in existence and widely
publicized since 1997, well before the sale of Lexmark's... laser printers
at issue here, and allows customers an unfettered choice in selecting
remanufacturing options, i.e., an up-front discount for a Prebate toner
cartridge to be returned only to Lexmark for remanufacturing or a
regular toner cartridge capable of being remanufactured by anyone.
29
The court noted prior holdings on the same issue and decided that an after-
market antitrust theory will not support an antitrust claim when the accused party has
26 982 F. 2d 693 (2d Cir. 1982).
27 "In short, in the computer industry, overly broad intellectual property protection directly restricts
competition and innovation. For this reason, U.S. courts in recent years have held that interface
specifications fall on the idea (or unprotected) side of copyright's idea/expression dichotomy." Amicus
Brief, supra note 25, at 5, citing Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S.
233 (1996); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-1525;
Jonathan Band & Masanobu Katoh, Interfaces on Trial, 131-146 (1995); 1 Paul Goldstein, Copyright §
2.15.2.1-2.15.2.2 (2d ed. 1998).
21 [d., at 709-10.
29 Lexmark, supra note 10, at 966.
been forthcoming about its policies and has not surreptitiously changed them.3" The
court ultimately granted Lexmark's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
31
The Lexmark court's decision is not in line with the letter and spirit of the
DMCA. Moreover, the decision nullifies important public policy considerations
because it unjustifiably curbs interoperability and chills competition. Whether or not
Congress decides to clarify this portion of the DMCA, the Lexmark case, with its
unintended consequences, will likely be memorialized in legal history books.3 2 The
Lexmark decision has extended the DMCA anticircumvention provisions to activities
that would have been considered fair use exceptions by most courts prior to the
enactment of the DMCA
II. Copyright Law - Elements Pertaining to this Discussion
Interoperability in technology is vitally important and essential to promoting
competition in the software industry. Nationwide, courts have interpreted copyright law
in a manner that does not defeat software interoperability.34 The difficulty inherent in
the Lexmark issue is that advanced technological devices are utilized to block reverse-
engineering. According to Static Control, many industries act similarly when they
manufacture products that need to be compatible with other systems; for example, the
aftermarket that makes wiper blades for cars, and video-game cartridges for game
30 id.
31 d., at 974.
32 Kramarsky, supra note 24.
33 Taylor and Andelman, supra note 7, at 4.
34 Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 22.
consoles.3 5 The nature of the thing being protected - in this case a chip that rejects
incompatible cartridges - is most likely what causes the consternation.
If it were a special kind of wiper blade for a car, and a company figured out how
to design it based on various experiments and calibrations, is it really a different thing?
That Lexmark took the extra step of designing the computer chip to protect itself is
certainly not insignificant, but perhaps the wiper blade-maker chose an extremely rare
plastic in the hopes that no one would be able to reproduce it. The issue is the same, but
the media are different. Technology is easier to misappropriate without protection in an
age where people from all over the world have some degree of technological savvy but
probably not much familiarity with hardware and raw materials. Moreover, it is more
likely that the average person can circumvent technological barriers than it is for that
person to have the expertise and equipment available to produce a wiper blade. The
bottom line is that "[f]aws intended to protect against copyright infringement should not
inhibit innovation and consumer choice."
36
A. Fair Use Exceptions
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, detailing how to make legitimate and non-
infringing copies, is related to the above discussion of new technologies. Courts weigh
various factors to determine whether a challenged activity qualifies as fair use,
including: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) whether the use is commercial or
not; (3) the nature of the work (wherein factual works receive less protection); (4) the
35 Ahrens, supra note 23.
36 Copyright and Fair Use; Repeated Abuse of a Statute is a Sign that the Law Itself is Defective, eWeek,
Dec. 8, 2003.
amount and substantiality of the allegedly infringed work; and (5) the effect of the
infringement upon the potential market for the work.37 As new technologies develop,
courts generally have the first opportunity to apply copyright law to them, and Congress
has the opportunity to change law as a result of unforeseen outcomes. 38 The public,
technologists, and copyright owners are therefore saved from having to apply to
Congress for legislative guidelines for each new technology that is developed.39
The 1984 Supreme Court case Sony v. Universal Studios,40 discusses the fair use
issue. In Sony, Universal Studios and the Walt Disney company sued Sony, seeking to
have the Betamax VCR impounded as a tool of piracy. Universal Studios and the Walt
Disney company felt that home taping of television violated the copyright owner's
reproduction right. The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that "time-shifting," or
taping for later use, was a fair use of the material. In essence, the Supreme Court
interpreted the Copyright Act and restructured the doctrine in response to technological
changes. Motion picture studios argued that Sony should build a sensor into every VCR
that would detect a signal that the video was store-bought. A more recent example of
fair use exceptions includes the MP3 and the ensuing development of technologies such
as MP3 jukeboxes, music servers, and Internet radio players. These advancements in
37 17 U.S.C. § 107.
38 See, e.g., Scott Moskowitz, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 104 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Nov. 29, 2000, available at http://www.bluespike.com/usco.html (last visited July 31,
2004).
39 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights Management: Preliminary Thoughts on the
(Irreconcilable?) Tension between Them, Computers, Freedom & Privacy, Apr. 16, 2002.
40 Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
music technology are the "space-shifting" equivalent of the VCR's "time-shifting"
justification.
B. Reverse-Engineering
Both legislation and court opinions show that reverse-engineering is a legitimate
way of discovering how something works. Reverse-engineering is an important method
for disseminating ideas, and it encourages competition in the marketplace. In Kewanee
Oil v. Bicron,4 1 the Court defined reverse-engineering as a "fair and honest means of
starting with the known product and working backwards to divine the process which
aided in its development or manufacture." 42 Congress has passed legislation in several
realms of technology that specifically permit reverse-engineering, such as the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act and the Competition of Contracting Act of 1984.
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, which explicitly privileges reverse-
engineering, allows chip designers to study the layout of circuits and to incorporate that
knowledge into the design of new chips. The Competition of Contracting Act of 1984
allows the defense industry to inspect and analyze the spare parts it purchases in order
to facilitate competition in government contracts.
Reverse-engineering has been described by many courts as an important part of
software development, although legislation on this issue is less clear.43  In
circumstances involving anti-reverse-engineering licensing provisions, however, courts
must first determine whether the enforcement of these provisions within contracts is
41 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
41 Id., at 476.
preempted by federal intellectual property law. Under the DMCA, for example, claims
involving the circumvention of technological protection systems must be analyzed as to
whether the reverse-engineering in question qualifies under any of the exemptions in
federal law. It is important to remember that the DMCA was meant to help copyright
law adjust to some of the new issues brought to the forefront by new technology.
However, the basic tenets of copyright law, including reverse-engineering and fair use
provisions, were not meant to be altered.
C. The Economics of Copyright Law
Fair use and reverse-engineering are two available tools for examining the
economic health and stability of a given copyright schema. Mark A. Lemley's 1997
law review article, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
44
provides an excellent discussion of the various elements in play at the nexus of
economics and copyright. Lemley points out that the relationship between creation and
an economic model indicates that creation occurs in some kind of a context and not a
vacuum. An individual author's creation relies on his or her past experience, which
invariably and unavoidably builds on other authors' works. Intellectual property
regimes curb the extent to which this is done. The question then becomes: How can one
improve upon something without using the previous model? Intellectual property laws
at this juncture must choose - or strike a balance - between a creator of an older work
41 See, e.g., Chilling Effects, Reverse Engineering, available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/reverse/
(last visited Aug. 19, 2004).
44 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev 989
(1997).
and a creator of a newer work. This analysis does not even consider the choice between
favoring creators over purchasers or vice versa.
Copyright law does not prevent another from using a work but only specifically
prevents its replication in the public arena. This small point is of vital importance in
the remainder of the analysis of copyright vis A vis the marketplace. Copyright
infringement is tested by comparing the accused work with the original work to
determine whether a threshold amount of copying has occurred. Verbatim or exact
copying is, of course, infringement. Beyond this bright line, however, different theories
come into play, one of which is fair use. The fair use doctrine is a unique form of
protection in some circumstances for potential 'improvers.' For example, where the
copying is unlikely to have a significant effect on the market, infringement is less likely
to be found. The fair use doctrine illustrates U.S. intellectual property law and its ties to
the economic gain it fosters. The connection between U.S. intellectual property law and
economic gain is different from some other regimes, wherein moral rights of authors are
a greater focus.
Lemley argues, however, that United States copyright law is significantly more
hostile to improvements than is patent law.45 He offers various theories of reasoning for
this, including: (a) the moral rights argument - the idea that inherent in someone's
creation is a link to that person's "id," which should not be violated; (b) the "different
works" argument - that perhaps there is more need for improvement in patent law than
in copyright law, and therefore less of an effort to curb it in the former; (c) the "balance
of power" argument - that copyright protection is easy to obtain and lasts a long time
45 Lemley, at 1028.
but it only protections actual copying; and (d) the "relative market power" argument -
which proffers that copyrighting confers less market power than does patenting.
4 6
In order for copyright law rules regarding improvement to dovetail with those of
patent law, the doctrine of fair use would need to be modified. The fair use doctrine has
the potential to protect radical improvers by exempting them from infringement
liability. However, the potential is not great because courts tend to focus primarily on
market harm to the copyright owner instead of the degree of ingenuity of the
improver.47 Inherent in Lemley's writing is the precept that intellectual property rights
have a direct effect on the marketplace. If United States copyright law is already hostile
to improvement, the Lexmark court's reading of the DMCA is even more blatantly
dangerous to the health of consumer welfare and to the encouragement of innovation.
III. Digital Rights Management: Other Technological Measures Invented to
Curb Copyright Infringement
Quelling piracy is a laudable goal, but chilling the dissemination of knowledge
to those who could otherwise lawfully reap benefits from exposure to it is not. Eroding
fair use in favor of strong DRM systems could be detrimental. 48 For example, there
could be:
a reduction in freedom of expression, to the extent that DRM interferes
with review, commentary, scholarship, and parody; a reduction in
innovation, to the extent that DRM eliminates the reservoir of incentives
that spur companies to develop technologies that interact with
copyrighted works... an erosion of privacy, to the extent that DRM
compromises user anonymity, [and] the freezing of fair use, to the extent
46 [d., at 1030.
47 Id., at 1077.
48 id.
that DRM systems will prevent courts from evolving fair use in response
to new technologies.
49
In broad terms, DRM acts as a set of technologies that content owners can use to
protect their intellectual property rights. In most instances, DRM is a system that both
encrypts digital media content and limits access to only those people who have acquired
a proper license to use that content.50 Put more concisely, "DRM is a technology that
enables the secure distribution, promotion, and sale of digital media content on the
Internet."
5
A. The Digital Watermarking Example
"Watermarking is part of a well-balanced diet of digital rights architectures," said
Dr. Joseph Winograd of Verance, a technology company.5 2 Copyright law has had to
develop and change in reaction to new technologies from its inception. The invention
of photography was, and still is, grappled with on several levels, and the fact that
software is copyrightable, of course, demonstrates that there are new ways of expressing
ideas that the drafters of the first copyright laws could not have imagined. While
scientific improvements and technological innovations facilitate piracy, they also
furnish new ways to prevent it.
One type of preventative technology for copyrightable material is digital
watermarking. Unlike traditional watermarks, which are intended to be somewhat
49 id.
50 Microsoft Windows, available at
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/WM7/DRM/what.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
51 id
52 Quoting Brad King, Fight Rages Over Digital Rights, Wired News, Jan. 16, 2001.
visible,53 digital watermarking is a "method of discreetly weaving information into all
forms of media content by making subtle adjustments to the content itself., 54 For
example, digital watermarking enables many forms of media such as images,
packaging, identity cards, video and music to interact with the digital world.55
Although imperceptible to the human eye, a digital watermark can be recognized by
devices and applications enabled with certain software.
Several companies use watermarking to identify sources of compromise. Before
an end-user can download content, for example, the distribution server can insert a
watermark into the content, identifying that user's account. 56  Some, if not all,
watermarks are at least somewhat vulnerable, however. For example, pirates can
reverse-engineer public watermarks or break through encrypted ones to remove them,
and they can also use successive approximation to make changes to content that are
imperceptible to the end-user until the watermark is no longer detectable.
57
An example of how watermark technology can function is Digimarc's
MarcSpider,TM a combined compliance licensing program, copyright registration and
image tracking device. Corbis Corporation, a visual solutions provider that licenses
images to advertisers, book producers, newspapers, magazines, and other media
53 A watermark is defined as a "transparent design or symbol seen when paper is held up to the light,
usually to indicate the genuineness of the document or the document's manufacturer." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (1999), 1586.
54 Digimarc Corporation, Glossary, available at http://www.digimarc.com/watermarking/glossary.asp (last
visited Aug. 17, 2004).
55 Id.
56 Nicholas Cravotta, The War on Copying, EDN, Oct. 16, 2003.
57
id.
suppliers, recently implemented the MarcSpider in-house. Corbis has found that
embedding Digimarc digital watermarks in millions of its images enables Corbis to
detect potential unlicensed uses of its image assets on the Web. Corbis also noted that,
to date, the cost of the compliance program has been more than offset by the revenue
generated from licenses and settlements.
58
This type of DRM is not universally praised, however. One open source
advocate said that DRM allows copyright owners to control rights that they do not
necessarily have. 59 Thus, some DRM formats seem to inherently distrust the public and
disallow reverse-engineering and fair use from ever taking place. A fundamental
problem with today's DRM strategies, according to Michael Vergara, director of
product marketing for RSA Security's developers solutions division, is that an e-security
system will always be based on the relationships and the degree of trust between parties.
Whether the environment rises to a comfortable level of trust or not, there must be a
reasonable correlation between the level of trust provided to consumers and the amount
of money spent on that assurance. This idea underlines what Vergara thinks of as a
flaw in the DRM marketplace. If customers pay money for a product, they believe they
have the right to use the product both as it was intended and also however they please.
A company can copy-proof a CD, but its DRM strategy fails when consumers purchase
58 Corbis Wins InfoWorld 100 Award, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 24, 2003.
59King, supra note 52.
60 Is DRM Just a Dream, RSA E-Security, Aug. 2002.
that CD but cannot copy it, or it does not play in every device that other CD's can be
played in. 61
The issue of digital rights management entails, and yet also transcends, the
general field of technology. An effective DRM must be supported by enforceable laws
and a sound business model. To reiterate the basic theme of this writing: The DMCA
is not a law that should assist in digital rights management goals insofar as they deter
reverse-engineering and fair use. In a recent case in Illinois, the court agreed.
IV. The Skylink Case
In November of 2003, an Illinois case involving garage door openers addressed
similar issues to the Lexmark case but it took a different - and better - stance.
Chamberlain Group, a manufacturer of garage door openers, included a security line in
their openers that used a rolling code technology, which prevents any capturing and
recording of transmitter signals, thereby preventing illegal access to a homeowner's
garage. 62 Skylink, a competitor of Chamberlain, distributed a universal remote control
device that operated many different brands of openers, amongst which was
Chamberlain's rolling code. Chamberlain argued that it never authorized consumers or
Skylink to circumvent the security measure in the rolling code. The court found that
this did not establish that Skylink violated the DMCA, and to the extent the competitor
was authorized reverse-engineer the manufacturer's openers, it could not have been held
liable under the DMCA. It is clear that to the extent Skylink was authorized to decrypt,
61 id
62 Chamberlain v. Skylink, supra note 11.
descramble, avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair Chamberlain's GDOs, it
cannot be held liable under the DMCA.63
The Skylink court ruled that homeowners have a legitimate expectation that they
will be able to access their garage if their transmitters are misplaced or if they
malfunction;64 thus, the judge rejected Chamberlain's argument that a garage door
owner violates the DMCA if he or she loses the original transmitter and continues to
operate the garage door with an after-market model. The CEO of Skylink Technologies,
pleased with the Court's ruling, suggested that the court's ruling would encourage free
market competition that benefits the consumer, and that Chamberlain's attempt to use
the DMCA against his company was an effort by a large corporation to limit a smaller
company's ability to compete in the marketplace and to decrease consumers' options.
Moreover, Skylink's CEO was grateful for the opportunity to take a stand on such an
important legal issue.
65
V. Possible Remedy Proposed by Representative Rick Boucher
Congressman Rick Boucher (D-VA) has been a dynamic advocate for repairing
some of the misunderstandings engendered by the ambivalent language in the DMCA.
In a statement to the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee in 2003, Representative
Boucher criticized several aspects of the DMCA, most notably the problem that the
current law makes it a federal offense to bypass technical protections that guard access
63 Id., at 1044.
64 [d., at 1045.
65 US District Court Ruling Absolves Skylink Technologies, PR Newswire, Nov. 25, 2003.
to a copyrighted work even when the purpose of that bypass is innocent and in line with
codified fair use exceptions.
66
In a statement to the press regarding his proposition to revamp the DMCA,
Representative Boucher stated that the fair use doctrine is being threatened in an
unprecedented fashion.67 He emphasized that the DMCA tilts the carefully-calibrated
balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the users of
copyrighted material drastically in favor of the copyright owner. To this end, along
with other congressmen, Representative Boucher has introduced a bill to ameliorate the
DMCA called the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act [hereinafter "DMCRA"]. 68
The DMCRA softens the DMCA's prohibition on reverse-engineering and
permits circumvention of antipiracy technology for fair use.69 Furthermore, upon its
passage, the DMCRA would ensure that it is not a violation of Section 1201 to
manufacture, distribute, or make noninfringing use of a hardware or software product
that enables the fair use of a copyrighted work, such as creating backup copies of
legally purchased CDs or other digital media. 70 Representative Boucher believes that a
certain amount of piracy happens regardless of what laws are in place, and the DMCA
is not going to stop it; the proposal would not make it more or less likely that people
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bent on committing piracy are going to commit it. Instead, Representative Boucher's




The DMCA was intended to bring copyright law up to speed with technological
advances. It was not meant to add a sui generis anticircumvention claim for reverse-
engineering, nor was it meant to chill competition by eradicating competitors who
depend on reverse-engineering. The Skylink case demonstrates a correct interpretation
of the DMCA to aftermarket competitors by allowing the fair use doctrine to come into
play as it would with any other copyrighted work. The Copyright Act has not been
revamped to adjust to technological locks that impede competition, but rather it has
been slightly retailored to impede rampant piracy. Upon enacting the DMCA in 1998,
Congress did not intend to prohibit users from circumventing technical restrictions to
make non-infringing uses of purchased content.
72
The provisions of the DMCA that speak to anticircumvention are inflicting an
"intolerable amount of collateral damage on other public policy priorities." 73 There are
currently two bills pending before Congress that propose a reformation of Section 1201
of the Copyright Act. Both bills represent steps in the right direction, potentially
reforming a law that has done substantially more harm than good in its first five years of
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existence. 74  While it may be an over-generalization to condemn the DMCA in its
current state, it is inexcusable to allow courts to continue interpreting the DMCA in a
fashion that preempts copyright law as it stood before the DMCA's implementation.
Several electronics trade associations and other interested parties are backing
Representative Boucher's bill, the DMCRA. Specifically, the language of the DMCRA
under Section 5(b), entitled "Fair Use Restoration" reads: "It shall not be a violation of
this title to manufacture, distribute, or make noninfringing use of a hardware or
software product capable of enabling significant noninfringing use of a copyrighted
work., 75 Fair use, after all, is still a valid defense. The only criminal conduct is
circumvention for the purpose of infringing a copyright.76 The DMCA was not written
to stifle competition in the replacement parts market, and its attempted use for this
purpose is an incorrect and alarming application of the Act.77 The Lexmark decision
demonstrates that the scope and intent of the DMCA has been misinterpreted and,
unless Static's appeal to the Sixth Circuit reverses the decision below,78 a clarification
of the statute, such as Representative Boucher's bill, may be necessary. The Lexmark
case will be addressed once again by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
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the next few months; its decision will be of great interest to many parties and has the
potential to rectify some indeterminate case law.
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